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FROM ULYSSES TO PORTNOY:
A PORNOGRAPHY PRIMER
WILLIAm F. EIc?K
In the November, 1959, issue of Field and Stream magazine, one of
America's great unsung humorists, Ed Zern, reviewed D. H. Law-
rence's controversial work, Lady Chatterley's Lover, and summarized
the novel with the following comment:
[This] fictional account of the day-by-day life of an English
gamekeeper is still of considerable interest to outdoor minded
readers, as it certainly contains many passages on pheasant rais-
ing, and apprehending of poachers, ways to control vermin and
chores and duties of the professional gamekeeper. Unfortunately,
one is obliged to wade through many pages of extraneous material
in order to discover and savor these sidelights on the manage-
ment of a midland shooting estate. In this reviewer's opinion
this book cannot take the place of J. R. Miller's PRACTICAL
GAMEKEEPER.
The problem was, of course, that any game manager or outdc.,w-
minded reader living in the state of New York at that time who wanted
to compare the pheasant-raising philosophies of Lawrence and Miller
would have had great difficulty in doing so, for Lady Chatterley had
been banned by the New York City Postmaster on grounds that it was
pornographic.' The ban was removed by a federal court decision de-
claring that the book was not obscene.2
The varying opinions of the book reviewer, the government official
and the judges set the tone for this discussion. Agreement is indeed
rare in obscenity matters. What is obscene depends largely on locality
and time. The first of these variables, locality, is exemplified in the
readily observable fact that films and other entertainments playing to
* B.A., Beloit College; J.D., University of Wisconsin; Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for the State of Wisconsin; formerly, law clerk for the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and lecturer in law at the University of Wisconsin.
Any views or opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and
in no way reflect positions or views of the Attorney General or the Wisconsin
Department of Justice.
" It thus joined the ranks of works like The Scarlet Letter, Catcher in the Rye,
Drums Along the Mohawk, Brave New World and, of all things, A History
of the United States From the Age of Exploration to 1865-all of which
(and many more) have been banned at one time or another in this country.
See M. ERNST & M. SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE
235-36 (1964).2 Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
packed houses in New York would probably not be allowed even a
single performance in Ashtabula or Des Moines. Courts, too, have
reflected this variable by finding certain publications obscene in some
areas and not obscene in others.3
The second factor, time, is illustrated by the dramatic change in
public acceptance of sex materials in the past twenty years. During
this period of time, we have moved from public outrage over Clark
Gable's utterance of the word "damn" in Gone With The Wind, to ap-
parent acceptance of total nudity in films like I Am Curious (Yellow).
Our tastes for the printed word have undergone a similar change-
from the secretive transfer of Forever Amber from hand to sweaty
hand in the 1940's, to the mountainous drugstore paperback displays of
Portnoy's Complaint in 1970.
It is not within the scope of this article to investigate the causes
of these differing attitudes-or even whether general attitudes have
truly changed, or truly differ, at all. The fact remains, however, that
films are being freely shown, and books and magazines openly pur-
chased and read, that would have been immediately suppressed twenty
years ago. What follows is only a summary of where we are, how we
got there, and one view of where we may be going in the area of ob-
scenity regulation. It does little more than skim the surface and raise
the problems; and it is primarily concerned with the development of a
non-definition.
A. ROTH: THE BUILD-UP AND AFTERMATH
For all the present confusion, both in the law and in society itself,
Americans have always felt a need to regulate obscenity. In simpler
times, obscenity was merely an offshoot of the "crimes" of profanity
and blasphemy.' Indeed, the 1868 English case that influenced obsceni-
ty standards in this country for almost one hundred years involved a
conviction for selling a pamphlet "showing the depravity of the Romish
priesthood, and the iniquity of the Confessional, and the questions put to
females in confession." 5 The standard devised by the court to deter-
mine the obscenity of the work was stated as follows:
[Whether] the tendency of the matter . . . is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences,
and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.6
3 John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure [Fanny Hill], for example,
has been deemed obscene in Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Rhode
Island, but was held not to be obscene in New York. See K. KuI, FOOLISH
FIGLEAVES: PORNOGRAPHY IN AND OUT OF COURT 138 (1967). A similar fate
was to befall many books- Tropic of Cancer perhaps most of all. See note
25 infra.
4 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 n.12 (1957).
5 Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 362 (1868).
6 Id. at 371. This standard permits the material to be judged by the effect of
isolated passages upon the most susceptible person in society and was re-
pudiated in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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This rule, which came to be called the Hicklin test, crossed the
Atlantic and was adopted by many courts in this country. As might
be expected, it was rejected in as many others. The legal definition of
obscenity truly varied from case to case and place to place.7
Finally, in 1956, obscenity became a question of federal constitu-
tional law. In Butler v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court
declared that a Michigan statute which prohibited the sale-even to an
adult-of any publication containing items which might tend to corrupt
the morals of minors, was unconstitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendment, with Justice Frankfurter noting that the net effect
of such a law is to "burn the house to roast the pig."9 Although the
appellants' argument was characterized by the court as taking "a wide
sweep," the conviction was reversed solely on grounds that the legis-
lation was not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it was said
to deal, for the reason that it reduced the adult population of Michigan
to "reading only what is fit for children." 10
Butler v. Michigan was followed, four months later, by the landmark
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States."
No question was raised in Roth as to the obscenity of the materials
involved, and the court stated the "dispositive question" presented as,
simply, "whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected
speech and press."' ' After holding quite specifically that "obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,"' '
Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, proceeded to consider
whether the statutes involved-a federal postal law and a California
penal statute-violated First Amendment guarantees.14 Both laws were
upheld on the basis of a test formulated in the opinion which has been
stated and restated as follows in hundreds of subsequent cases:
7 See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1966).
s 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
9 Id. at 383. The statute prohibited the dissemination of material
[Containing] obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious language, or obscene,
immoral, lewd or lascivious prints, pictures, figures or descriptions, tend-
ing to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth ....
The conceptual similarity between the language of the Michigan statute and
the Hicklin test is obvious-both are directed toward materials which "tend
to corrupt" society's most susceptible members.
'o Id. at 382-84.
"1354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12 Id. at 382. The fundamental constitutional question actually had been raised
several years before in a case involving Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate
County, but the Court (in the absence of Justice Frankfurter) was evenly
divided and the publisher's conviction was affirmed without opinion. Double-
day & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), aff'g 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d
6 (1947).
13354 U.S. at 485.
14 The federal law (18 U.S.C. 1461 (1964) ) declared "obscene, lewd, lascivious
or filthy" materials to be non-mailable; the California statute (CAL. PENAL
CoDE § 311 ( )) made it a misdemeanor to disseminate "obscene or inde-
cent" material.
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[Whether] to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest. 15
This was a direct and very specific negation of the Hicklin rule. No
longer was that standard that of the most "susceptible person," but that
of the average person in the community; and no longer could isolated
passages, taken out of context, be judged.
The Court was far from unanimous, however. Chief Justice Warren
concurred, expressing his concern that the decision was overbroad, and
pointing to the conduct of the defendant, rather than the nature of the
materials, as the central issue in such cases.16 Justice Harlan concurred
in the affirmance of the state case and dissented in the federal case,
expressing in great detail his view that the states have primary respon-
sibility in the area of obscenity regulation-a responsibility with which
federal courts "should be slow to interfere.' 1 7  Justices Black and
Douglas, in a joint dissent, paved the road they would travel (with only
slight deviation) through all of the obscenity cases:
The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was
designed to preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing
the values of speech against silence. The First Amendment puts
free speech in the preferred position.
Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent
that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an insep-
arable part of it.'
The next major case to reach the Court was Manual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day,19 which involved a challenge to an administrative finding
of the Post Office Department that certain magazines were obscene and
thus non-mailable. Although the decision (reversing the administra-
tive findings) is generally regarded as amplifyIng the Roth test, the
Court was hopelessly divided. Justices Harlan and Stweart felt that
the magazines were not obscene; Justices Brennan, Warren and Doug-
las concurred in the reversal on other grounds; Justice Black concurred
15354 U.S. at 489. The various elements of the test-community standards,
the material-as-a-whole concept, etc.-had been separately enunciated in a
wide variety of prior cases, some going back to the early days of the century.
Id. at 489 n.26. The term "prurient" has never been defined in terms other
than the dictionary definition which relates it to "itching," or "longing."
16 Id. at 495. In giving greater weight to the disseminator's conduct than to the
type of materials being disseminated, the Chief Justice laid the groundwork
for the later, and highly controversial, "pandering" rule of Ginsburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
1' 354 U.S. at 502. Justice Harlan also questioned the propriety of deciding the
constitutional questions without making a determination on the obscenity of
the materials themselves. To justice Harlan, the question of whether a par-
ticular work is obscene is not an issue of fact, but rather one of "constitu-
tional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind." Id. at 498.
'8Id. at 514.
is 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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in the result without opinion; Justice Clark dissented, and Justices
White and Frankfurter did not participate.
The Harlan-Stewart opinion, which appears first in the reports,
states that a determination that the materials are "so offensive on their
face as to affront current community standards of decency" is essential
to the determination of obscenity.20 Thus, "patent offensiveness" came
to be regarded as a separate element of the Roth test.
The Roth test came before the Court again in 1964.21 Here, too, the
members of the Court were unable to agree on an opinion, although
six justices did vote to reverse the conviction of a Cleveland Heights,
Ohio, motion picture exhibitor for violation of an Ohio statute prohib-
iting (among other things) the showing of "obscene, lewd or lascivi-
ous" films.2 Justice Brennan, joined by justice Goldberg, restated the
Roth test, and emphasized that the constitutional status of the questioned
material cannot be made to turn on a "weighing" of its social impor-
tance against its prurient appeal, "for a work cannot be proscribed un-
less it is 'utterly' without social importance." 23 The opinion found no
such "utter void" in the film in question, noting that it had been fa-
vorably reviewed in a number of national publications (although dis-
paraged in others), and was "rated by at least two critics of national
stature among the best films of the year in which it was produced." 24
B. THEF, 1966 Tito: MISHKIN, GINZBURG AND FANNY HILL
1966 was a banner year for obscenity cases. Roth and the melange
of opinions that followed had, quite predictably, led to more and more
20 Id. at 482. Even though it appeared in a "minority" opinion, later decisions
have adopted "patent offensiveness" as part of the Roth formula. See Annot.,
5 A.L.R.3d 1158, 1171 (1966, Supp. 1969).
21 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).2 2 Ono Rzv. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1963).
23 378 U.S. at 191.2 4 Id. at 196. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the reversal on the basis
of their now-familiar views: (1) the Supreme Court is "the most inappropri-
ate . . . Board of Censors that could be found"; and (2) the First Amend-
ment safeguards all citizens against conviction for exhibiting a motion picture.
Id. Justice Stewart also concurred, expressing his view that, under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, criminal laws in this area are constitutionally
limited to "hard-core pornography." Id. at 197. Justice Stewart's own defini-
tion of hard-core pornography was, quite simply, "I know it when I see it."
This is no mere tongue-in-cheek statement and may, in fact, be one of the
more workable definitions of obscenity if people are to continue to legislate
in this area. It is highly probable, for example, that most trial judges and
juries use this very approach (albeit unconsciously), for the Roth test is suf-
ficiently malleable to be easily adapted to any result in virtually any case.
Justice Stewart amplified his definition of hard-core pornography in Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 n.3 (1966).
Justice Harlan dissented on the basis that the state courts should have a
greater say in the matter, and Justices Warren and Clark agreed in a separate
opinion that expressed the view that a state court's application of Roth should
carry great weight and that review should be limited to the consideration of
whether there is sufficient supporting evidence in the record. 378 U.S. at 202.
These nine men, whether they planned it or not, had become a national board
of censors.
1970]
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confusion,25 and the Court, on March 21, 1966, issued three opinions
that had the effect of deepening the uncertainty and sending publisher
Ralph Ginzburg to prison for a crime apparently created on the spot.
The Court's continuing failure to reach some common ground on the
subject of obscenity is silently (but eloquently) reflected in the fact
that, in these three cases, no less than fourteen separate opinions were
filed.
One of the two cases in this trio containing an "opinion of the
court" is AMIishkin v. New York26 which held that the "average person"
described in the Roth test really does not have to be "average" at all.
Some of the books involved in the Mishkin prosecution depicted "vari-
ous deviant sexual practices, such as flagellation, fetishism and lesbian-
ism."'27 The argument was made that such materials did not satisfy the
"prurient appeal" portion of the Roth test because they would only
disgust or sicken the average person, and would neither stimulate him
nor appeal to his prurient interests. The Court, noting that the mate-
rials were conceived and marketed for sexually deviant groups (for
whom they apparently had some prurient appeal), rejected this argu-
ment and held that:
When the material is designed for and primarily disseminated
to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public
at large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is
satisfied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest of that group.
28
The second case, Ginzburg v. United States,29 is probably the best-
known of the three, and certainly has caused the most comment. Ginz-
burg was convicted for using the mail to distribute obscene literature
in connection with the publication and sale of the magazine "Eros" and
a book entitled "The Housewives' Handbook on Selective Promiscuity."
Justice Brennan's opinion, representing the majority view (five jus-
tices) upheld the conviction on the basis that, even assuming the mate-
rials to be not obscene, where they are created or exploited on the basis
of their prurient appeal, they are not constitutionally protected.30
25 The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in 1963, for example, that courts in
California, Connecticut, Maryland and Pennsylvania had declared Henry
Miller's Tropic of Cancer obscene, while courts in Massachusetts and Illinois
had taken an opposite position-all while using the Roth test. The Wisconsin
court adopted the former view. See McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis.
2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963).
26 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
27 Id. at 508.
28 Id. The titles of the many books involved, which are printed in an appendix
to the opinion, are certainly interesting (and highly imaginative), if not prur-
iently so: e.g., Dance With the Dominant Whip, Fearful Ordeal in Restraint-
land, The Strap Returns, and The Whipping Choruts Girls.
29383 U.S. 463 (1966).
30 Id. at 474-75. If not entitled to constitutional protection, it follows (under the
Roth rationale) that they are. obscene. While perhaps logically unsound, it
[Vol. 53
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Whatever validity the criticisms of Ginzburg may possess,3 one
thing is clear: "pandering" is now an element to be considered in de-
termining obscenity. Pandering is defined in Ginzburg as "the busi-
ness of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal
to the erotic interest of ... customers. 32
The last of the 1966 cases, A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General (Fanny Hill),33 is prob-
ably the most significant of the three, even though the court, in revers-
ing a Massachusetts decision adjudging the book obscene, could not
agree on a single opinion. The opinion of Justice Brennan (joined by
Justices Warren and Fortas), refines the Roth definition of obscenity
into a three-pronged test:
Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three
elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the de-
scription of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly with-
out redeeming social value.
34
As if to amplify the confusion over "pandering," the opinion re-
emphasizes the fact that material cannot be proscribed-even though it
is patently offensive and possesses the requisite prurient appeal-unless
seems that this conclusion must follow from (1) the Court's assumption that
the materials are not obscene per se, and (2) the Court's resultant decision
that they are nonetheless not constitutionally protected and that the publisher
may be convicted for sending obscene matter through the mails. Thus, al-
though not expressly so stating, Ginzburg must mean that non-obscene matter
may be made obscene by the manner in which it is distributed.
31 Two of the dissenting justices leveled what is probably the most cogent criti-
cism of the decision. Justice Black observed that:
Only one stark fact emerges with clarity out of the confusing welter
of opinions and thousands of words written in this and two other cases
today. That fact is that Ginzburg, petitioner here, is now finally and
authoritatively condemned to serve five years in prison for distributing
printed matter about sex which neither Ginzburg nor anyone else could
possibly have known to be criminal. 383 U.S. at 476.
Justice Stewart, in a separate opinion, echoed Justice Black's due process ob-
jections and went on to state:
For me, however, there is another aspect of the Court's opinion in
this case that is even more regrettable. Today the Court assumes the
power to deny Ralph Ginzburg the protection of the First Amendment
because it disapproves of his "sordid business." That is a power the
Court does not possess. For the First Amendment protects us all with
an even hand. It applies to Ralph Ginzburg with no less completeness
and force than to G. P. Putnam's Sons. In upholding and enforcing the
Bill of Rights, this Court has no power to pick or to choose. When we
lose sight of that fixed star of constitutional adjudication, we lose our
way. For then we forsake a government of law and are left with gov-
ernment by Big Brother. Id. at 501.
32383 U.S. at 467. This definition is taken, interestingly enough, from Chief
Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
495 (1957).
33 383 U.S. 413 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fanny Hill-the popular name of
the book involved].
4 Id. at 418.
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it is utterly without redeeming social value. Each of these three criteria
must be applied independently: a book's social value cannot be balanced
against (or cancelled by) its prurient appeal or patent offensiveness.3 5
But the opinion mentions the Ginzburg "pandering" test and states that,
assuming "a minimum of social value,"
Evidence that the book was commercially exploited for the sake
of prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other values, might
justify the conclusion that the book was utterly without redeem-
ing social importance.36
Recalling the fact that, of the decisions in Mishkin, Ginzburg and
Fanny Hill, only the first two involved clear majority opinions, one is
rather limited in drawing legal conclusions.37 It is safe to say, however:
(1) that the manner in which material is distributed or disseminated
may bear heavily on the question of obscenity (Ginzburg) and, (2)
that the obscenity or non-obscenity of a particular item depends not
really on its effect on the "average person," but rather upon its effect
on the "intended recipient group" (Mishkin).
The separate opinions filed in the three cases repeat and refine
views expressed earlier by the individual members of the court. Jus-
tice Douglas remained firm in his view that the First Amendment does
not permit censorship of expression without accompanying illegal action
and that "Whatever may be the reach of the power to regulate conduct
. .. the First Amendment leaves no power in government over ex-
pression of ideas."38
Justice Clark voted with the majority in Mishkin and Ginzburg, and,
in his separate dissent in Fanny Hill, disagreed with the notion that
material must be utterly without redeeming social value in order to be
proscribed, stating instead his adherence to the "original" Roth test.39
Justice Harlan, true to the views expressed in his separate opinion in
Roth, would give the states much wider latitude in the area of obscenity
regulation than that allowed to the federal government (whose regu-
latory powers would be limited to "hard-core pornography". 40 Justice
White would rule out the notion that social value is an independent
35 Id. at 419.36 Id. at 420.
87 Subsequent cases have, however, adopted the principles of the Brennan opinion
without mentioning that he was not speaking for a majority. See Annot., 5
A.L.R.3d 1158, 1169-72 (1966, Supp. 1969).
38383 U.S. at 433 (concurring opinion; see also Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 492-93 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
39 383 U.S. at 441-43 (dissenting opinion). justice Clark has, of course, been
replaced on the Court by Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion in the most
recent and perhaps far-reaching of the post-Roth cases, Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969), which held that private possession of obscene material
cannot be made a crime.
40 383 U.S. at 456-58 (dissenting opinion) ; Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463, 493 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502,
515 (1966) (concurring opinion).
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criteria in the Roth test and feels instead that materials are to be judged
by their predominant themes.41 Justice Stewart filed separate opinions
in Fanny Hill and Mishkin on the basis of his view that only "hard
core" pornography may be suppressed 42 and dissented in Ginzburg on
due process and other grounds.43 Justice Black held to his well-known
absolutist view of the First Amendment and wrote that the federal
government is without authority to censor speech, regardless of the
subject matter.44
Justice Brennan, of course, wrote the "lead" opinion in Fanny Hill,
and the majority opinions in Ginzburg and Mishkin. He was joined in
each by Justices Warren and Fortas-neither of whom is now on the
Court.
C. STANLEY AND GINSBERG-A NEw DIREcTIoN
There have been two important obscenity cases since 1966. The
first, Ginsberg v. New York,4 5 has primary significance for legislators,
for it upheld the validity of a New York statute setting separate ob-
scenity standards for persons under 17 which are far more restrictive
than those applicable to adults.4 6 The language of the opinion, with its
references to the parents' right to rear their own children and the state's
power to regulate the well-being of children, makes it clear that the
decision is not grounded solely on traditional First Amendment con-
siderations.
4 7
The second case, Stanley v. Georgia,48 held that the First and Four-
41 383 U.S. at 461-62 (dissenting opinion). Justice White voted with the major-
ity in Mishkin and Ginzburg.
42 Id. at 421 (concurring opinion); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518
(1966) (dissenting opinion). See the discussion of Justice Stewart's views,
supra note 24. Justice Stewart's Ginzburg opinion does, however, amplify his
definition of "hard-core pornography" by quoting as follows from the brief
of the Solicitor General in that case:
".. . Such materials include photographs, both still and motion picture,
with no pretense of artistic value, graphically depicting acts of sexual
intercourse, including various acts of sodomy and sadism, and some-
times involving several participants in scenes of orgy-like character. They
also include strips of drawings in comic-book format grossly depicting
similar activities in an exaggerated fashion. There are, in addition,
pamphlets and booklets, sometimes with photographic illustrations, verb-
allying describing such activities in a bizarre manner with no attempt
whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or situation and with no
pretense to literary value. All of this material . . . cannot conceivably
be characterized as embodying communication of ideas or artistic values
inviolate under the First Amendment. . . " 383 U.S. at 499 n.3.
43 383 U.S. at 497-501 (dissenting opinion).
44 Fanny Hill, 383 U.S. 413, 421 (1966) (concurring opinion); Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476-82 (1966) (dissenting opinion) ; Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515-18 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
45 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
46 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1967) uses the term "harmful to
minors," together with a lengthy and involved series of definitions which are
graphic enough to have caused at least one wag to classify the law itself as
obscene.
47 See also the dissents of Justices Douglas and Fortas, 390 U.S. at 650 and 671.
48 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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teenth Amendments prohibit making the mere private possession of
obscene material a crime. Like Ginsberg, this case did not turn solely
on "freedom of speech" questions, but seems to be grounded largely on
a person's right to privacy#
9
D. THE SUm TOTAL-CONFUSION
As of this writing, then, we can assume the following: (1) Obsceni-
ty (other than that in private possession) is not within the protections
afforded by the First Amendment ;50 (2) The test for determining
what is obscene is whether to the average person applying contempo-
rary community standards the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to the prurient interest;51 (3) The "community"
against whose standards the material is judged may be a national com-
munity, a local community, or something in between ;92 (4) There
probably must be, in addition, a determination that the material is so
patently offensive as to affront current community standards of decen-
cy ;53 (5) There probably also must be a determination that the material
4 For example, "These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case
before us. He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the
right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the con-
tents of his library." 394 U.S. at 565.
Stanley leads to a rather strange result. Under it I am permitted to acquire,
keep, and otherwise use as much pornography as I please; but even so, no
one can legally sell me any.
50 As might be expected, at least one case has held to the contrary. A three-
judge United States District Court in Massachusetts has held that Stanley
protects a public showing of a concededly obscene film in a commercial theater
-thus overruling Roth, despite Stanley's statement that Roth remains alive.
Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969).
51 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
52 The opinion of Justices Harlan and Stewart in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962), states that the obscenity standard under the
federal postal laws should be a national standard. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184 (1964), which was, like Manual Enterprises, a "no-opinion" decision,
the opinion of Justices Brennan and Goldberg discusses the problems of local
versus national standards and states that the determinant must be a national
standard, for "It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding."
378 U.S. at 195.
The problem is, of course, that state courts must also follow the same
"national" document and they do not all agree on the geographical limits of
the "community." Some feel that only a national standard is applicable. See
State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397 P.2d 949 (1964) ; State v. Vollmar, 389
S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1965) ; State v. Childs, 447 P.2d 304 (Ore. 1968). Some say
that the standard is statewide. See McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d
134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963) ; In re Gianninni, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72
Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968). At least one state has held that a nationwide standard
is applicable to printed and published material, while local standards govern
local "events," like a burlesque show. See City of Newark v. Humphres, 94
N.J. Super. 384, 228 A.2d 550 (1967).
53 This entry is purposely ambivalent, for the element of "patent offensiveness"
is found in the opinion of Justices Harlan and Stewart in Manual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), one of the cases in which the Court could
not agree on an opinion. It has been stated, however, that this element is
implicit in the Roth test. See State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247,
196 A.2d 225 (1963).
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is utterly without social importance ;54 (6) Assuming that the elements
described in (4) and (5) really do join prurient appeal to make up
the three-point test mentioned earlier,55 it may also be true that all
three are cumulative, and must be applied independently of each other ;56
(7) The "average person" mentioned in (2), above, need not be very
average after all, for, if material is designed for and primarily dissemi-
nated to a clearly-defined deviant group, its prurient appeal may be
judged in terms of that group, rather than the general public ;57 and,
(8) If the material is "openly advertised to appeal to the erotic in-
terest," disregard all of the above-your search may be over. This
type of "pandering" may make the material obscene even if it does
not fail all of the other tests.5
Finally, the most recent cases have established that: (1) the con-
cept of obscenity is variable, and states may impose stricter standards
upon children than they may upon the adult population ;59 and (2) mere
private possession of obscene materials may not be made a crime.6°
So, we come full circle. Determining what is obscene today is
virtually as uncertain a task as it was prior to Roth. In addition, a
growing group of recent federal cases hints that the entire concept as
we have known it may be on the wane.
E. THE NEW WAVE
The most intense activity in the area of obscenity law is taking
place in federal district courts throughout the country, and the ques-
tions raised primarily procedural.
The Federal Civil Rights Act61 provides (among other things) a
civil action to restrain interference with activities protected by the First
Amendment. Under it, a civil action will lie to enjoin prosecution under
a state obscenity statute where the law operates-or state officials act-
so as to impair the First Amendment right of the complainant.6 2 The
first challenge-to the constitutionality of the applicable state law-rais-
es the "traditional" First Amendment and due process questions under
Roth and similar cases, together with questions of scienter,6 3 and, in
54 The "social importance" element comes from the opinion of Justices Brennan
and Goldberg in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), another "no-opinion"
case.
55 See note 34, supra.
56 See the opinion of justices Brennan, Warren and Fortas in Fanny Hill, supra
note 35.
57Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
58 See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
5 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
,0 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6128 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
62See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
63 This refers, in simplest terms, to the rule that, to be convicted, a disseminator
must have some knowledge (or be held to some reasonable standard of
knowledge) of the obscene nature of the material he is circulating. See Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Courts will usually require proof of
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some cases, prior restraint" (both of which are beyond the scope of
this article).
The second challenge-going to the manner in which the law is
administered by state and local officials-has been making interesting
inroads into traditional methods of obscenity law enforcement. Gen-
erally, the cases indicate that no one is immune from good-faith prose-
cution under a valid state law, and that such action does not amount to
the type of impairment of constitutional rights necessary to justify
enjoining the prosecution.6 5 The federal courts will, however, enjoin
any "harrassment or intimidation" that goes beyond good faith prose-
cution.
The prime example of the type of conduct which federal courts
have enjoined is mass or overboard seizure of films, books or other
material-with or without a warrant-without a prior adversary deter-
mination that they are obscene.66
Courts have also recognized that practices short of seizure may
operate to impair protected rights-conduct such as public "blacklist-
ing" of material by officers or prosecutors." A New York district
court has similarly enjoined state officials where police officers were
constantly present in a bookstore in full view of actual and potential
customers. 6 Other courts have held that mere threats to prosecute can
amount to sufficient harassment to support an injunction.69
In all of these cases, however, only the "extracurricular" conduct
scienter to sustain a conviction-whether or not the state statute requires it.
See also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1966). The Wisconsin
court, for example, has interpreted the "silent" state statute as requiring
scienter under Smith v. California. See State v. Chobot, 12 Wis. 2d 110, 118-
19, 106 N.W.2d 286, 291 (1960).
64 The concept of prior restraint, roughly speaking, deals with official restric-
tions imposed upon forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
exhibition. Prior restraint is thus distinguished from subsequent punishment
(a penalty imposed after the communication has been made). Generally, a
system of prior restraints prevents the communication or exhibition from
being made at all, whereas a system of subsequent punishment permits the
communication, but imposes a penalty after the fact. For a variety of reasons,
the impact on freedom of expression may be quite different, depending on
whether the control is designed to block exhibition in advance or to deter
further exhibition by a later punishment.
In constitutional terms, the First Amendment forbids government to im-
pose any restraint or pre-censorship in advance of communication (with cer-
tain limited exceptions) in any area of expression within the purview of that
amendment. By incorporating the First Amendment in the Fourteenth, the
same limitations are applicable to the states.
65 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943).
66 A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v.
Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) ; Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th
Cir. 1968).
67 HMH Publishing Co. v. Garrett, 151 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ind. 1957).68Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
69 Poulos v. Rucker, 288 F. Supp. 305 (M.D. Ala. 1968), citing Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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has been enjoined, and "good-faith" prosecutions have been permitted
to continue.7°
Some recent federal cases have gone further and have either en-
joined prosecutions, or, by the sheer weight of the decisions, have
made prosecutions impossible without a prior adversary determination
that the materials are obscene. A distirct court in Louisiana, for ex-
ample, held that a person may not be arrested for violation of a state
obscenity law prior to a judicial determination that the materials in-
volved are obscene. 71 A district court in Florida has apparently en-
joined a state prosecution on this basis alone."2 Other courts presented
with similar questions, however, have gone the other way and have
not required a prior determination of obscenity before a good-faith
prosecution may be commenced.7 3 One case has held that there is no
constitutional defect in the lack of a prior adversary hearing where
the state seizes only a single copy of a film for use as evidence in an
obscenity prosecution.7 4
The Federal District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
declined to follow those cases requiring an adversary hearing on the
obscenity question in advance of arrest.7 5 The court relied instead on a
seventh circuit case, Metzger v. Pearcy7 6 in which the prosecution was
permitted to continue using one copy of the subject film which was
supplied by the exhibitor.77 The same question is pending in Wiscon-
sin's Eastern District at the time of this writing.78
Similarly, in Pinkus v. Arnebaugh79 the court found that a judicial
determination of obscenity prior to "the institution in good faith of a
complaint and/or arrest for violation of the state obscenity laws", was
not required by the First Amendment. In Milky Way Productions, Inc.
v. Leary,80 the court, after a lengthy discussion, held that no adversary
70 Other cases where the court enjoined extracurricular activities but refused to
enjoin the prosecutions include: Fontaine v. Dial, 303 F. Supp. 436 (W.D.
Tex. 1969); Toth v. Silbert, 184 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1960); HMH
Publishing Co. v. Garrett, 151 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ind. 1957); New Ameri-
can Library v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
731Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969).
72 Geibig v. City of Hallendale, Civil No. 69-1005 (S.D. Fla.).
73 Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Carter v. Gautier, 305
F. Supp. 1198 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
4Bazzell v. Gibbens, 306 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969). The court-oddly
enough the same court that decided the Delta Book case, supra note 71, dis-
distinguished Fanny Hill and similar cases on the basis that the seizures in
those cases involved thousands of publications which were seized for pur-
poses of destruction rather than for evidence.
75 Amato v. Ruth, Civil No. - (W.D. Wis. 1970).
76 See note 66, supra.......
77 The court did, however, enjoin any "interference with the exhibition of the
picture," and ordered the return of four copies previously seized by the officers.
393 F.2d at 204.
78 Eve Productions v. Fink, Civil No. 69-C-383, filed Aug. 7, 1969.
79258 F. Supp. 996, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 1966); see also Rage Books v. Leary, 301
F. Supp. 546, 552 (S.D. N.Y. 1969)80305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
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hearing was required prior to initiation of a state obscenity prosecu-
tion. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, per curiam, and with-
out opinion.8 '
Thus, the procedural aspects of obscenity cases partake of the same
uncertainty that has always been associated with judicial definition of
the term.
F. SOME SPECULATION ON THE FUTURE OF OBSCENITY REGULATION
The seeds of the future may well have been planted by the Supreme
Court in an apparently offhand per curiam comment in Redrup v. New
Yor ,8 2 a frequently-cited opinion. In that case, the Court declined to
discuss any of the several constitutional questions presented,)" and ruled
instead that all of the publications involved were not obscene under any
of the justices' divergent views of the Roth standard.8 4 At one point
in its brief opinion, the Court states:
In none of the cases was there a claim that the statute in question
reflected a specific and limited state concern for juveniles .... In
none was there any suggestion of an assault upon individual
privacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it
impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to. it.
... And in none was there evidence of the sort of "pandering"
which the Court found significant in Ginzburg .... 85
In Stanley v. Georgia,s6 the Court bolstered the uncertainty as to
the viability of Roth and subsequent cases. Roth, after all, held quite
specifically that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press. 8 7 Very clear, indeed. Yet, early in the
Stanley opinion the Court stated:
Roth and its progeny certainly do mean that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments recognize a valid governmental interest
in dealing with the problem of obscenity. But the assertion
s New York Feed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970).
82386 U.S. 767 (1967).
83The cases-two criminal convictions from New York and Kentucky and an
Arkansas civil obscenity judgment-involved questions of scienter, vagueness
and prior restraint. When certiorari was granted, it was assumed that the
materials involved were obscene. See Redrup v. New York, Austin v. Kentucky,
and Gent v. Arkansas, all at 384 U.S. 767 (1967).S4386 U.S. at 518. The opinion drew a sharp rebuke from Justices Harlan and
Clark, who dissented on the basis that the Court should have either decided
the constitutional issues so clearly presented to it (and the sole issues on
which certiorari was granted) or dismissed the writs. Id. at 772.
Since its issuance, Redrup has been the major tool used by the court for
per curiam reversals of obscenity convictions. See, e.g., Henry v. Louisiana,
392 U.S. 655 (1968). In its use of simple citations to Redrup as authority for
reversal in Henry and several other state cases, the Court reaches the apex
of its role as the nation's supreme board of censors-and thus realizes the very
fear expressed by some of its members several years earlier. See the dis-
cussion of Jacobellis v. Ohio in note 24, supra.85 386 U.S. at 769.
s8 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
87 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
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of that interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all
constitutional protections. Neither Roth nor any other decision
of this Court reaches that far. As the Court said in Roth itself,
'[c] easeless vigilance is the watchword to prevent.., erosion [of
First Amendment rights] by Congress or by the States. The
door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be
left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slight-
est crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more impor-
tant interests.' s
These statements, taken in conjunction with the "protection-of-
children" and "pandering" decisions in the Ginsberg and Ginzburg
cases, give rise to the somewhat plausible theory that the Roth notion
that obscenity is not a protected form of speech has gone by the boards.
In its place is the proposition that obscenity, as that term is generally
understood, is within the protections of the First Amendment except
insofar as it: (1) amounts to an unsolicited intrusion into individual
privacy by publication or distribution in a manner so obtrusive as
would render it difficult for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure;
or, (2) furthers a specific (and limited) state concern for juvpniles.
It should not be long before this theory is fully tested. A three-
judge federal court in Massachusetts recently held that, under Stanley,
the First Amendment forbids prosecution for showing an obscene film
in a public theater (where the adult viewers paid for admission and
were forewarned of the nature of the film.) 89 . The court's theory ap-
pears to be that the conviction in Stanley could never have been over-
turned if Roth were still intact. The decision has been appealed.90 A
three-judge court in California has met the same argument and appar-
ently adopted it,91 while another district court in Massachusetts has up-
held a state obsenity law, declaring its belief that Stanley in no way
impairs Roth.9 2
Perhaps the forthcoming decision in Karalexis v. Byrne, supra, will
settle these and the many other uncertainties; and again, perhaps not.
This is, after all, what everyone expected from Roth; and we certainly
expected a thorough clarification of the law from Mishkin, Ginzburg
and Fanny Hill in 1966.
The "obtrusiveness/child-protection" theory advanced above does
not seem at all unreasonable in the light of unmistakable social trends.
Such a theory would, for the present at least, have its basis in two or
88 394 U.S. at 563.
89 Karalexix v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969).
90 Appeal docketed, Feb. 4, 1970, Docket No. 1149. The case was argued before
the United States Supreme Court on April 30, 1970, but has since been re-
stored to the Court's calendar for reargument. See 38 U.S.L.W. 3521 (June
30, 1970.91 United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, Civil No. - (C.D. Cal., Jan.
27, 1970).
92 Palladino v. McBrine, 310 F. Supp. 308 (D. Mass. 1970).
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three of the clearest expressions to issue from the Supreme Court in
many years-Ginsberg v. New York and Stanley v. Georgia. In
Ginsberg, the court specifically declined to question the propriety of a
legislative assumption that exposure to certain obscene materials is
harmful to children, and it also provided clear constitutional guidelines
for such regulation.93 As for adult population, the opposite appears to be
true. By upholding the right to possess privately (and to use) obscene
materials, the Court in Stanley seems to rule out any possible justifica-
tion for "adult" laws regulating obscenity which are based upon its
actual or potential harm-either to the individual himself or to society
in general. Had the Court considered obscenity to be harmful as such,
and that this factor justified its regulation, how could it, at the same
time, sanction unlimited private possession (which, of course, implies
the same sanction for acquisition) and use?
If we must, as we have always done, impose restrictions on morally
offensive materials, and, further, if we do not wish to accomplish this
end through a haphazard system which relegates the impossible task
of rendering universal moral judgments to a small group of judges,
perhaps we should turn to a system based solely on obtrusiveness and
the protection of children. Such a system assumes, of course, that
adults can handle exposure to obscene materials; and this is a question
that has evoked the widest possible range or response.
Anti-smut groups have apparently taken the position that even the
mini-skirt is a dangerous and proven cause of criminal behavior. 94 At
the other end of the spectrum is the view that exposure to obscenity
can be beneficial in many instances-by providing an outlet for re-
pressed, and potentially dangerous, sexual urges. 95 Probably the clearest
conclusion is that there is little empirical basis for any conclusion that
exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant sexual behavior or
crimes of sexual violence.96
93 In the wake of Ginsberg, man
, 
states adopted legislation closely following
the "approved" language of the New York statute. For the Wisconsin ex-
ample, see Ch. 405, Laws of 1969.
9- See "Mini-Skirts and the Rise in Crime," in The National Decency Reporter
[published by Citizens for Decent Literature, Inc.] 13 (November-December
1969). The article concluded that "[The] mini-skirt is a serious cause of sex
crimes .... " and is based upon a survey (apparently CDL's own) of "the
nation's top law enforcement officials in 62 cities."
95 See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-
Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MiNT. L. REV. 1009 (1962)
Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WA'AYNE L. REV. 665 (1964).
96 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1969). Presumably, this could
be phrased in the opposite: that there is no evidence that it does not lead to
such behavior. It is, however, usually phrased as above.
The thesis appears to be borne out in extremis on Madison Avenue. What
could be more obscene than a huge, iron-encased fist bursting through the
hole in the top of a washing machine; or a white-clothed knight bearing a
long lance advancing on your dirty clothes; or a luscious blonde writhing on
the hood of an automobile? The aim here must be to appeal to my prurient
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In the end, we do have freedom of expression; we do have a right
of privacy; and we do have an interest in the protection of our children.
To date, Roth and subsequent tests have not been able to fully adjust
these often conflicting rights-particularly the right of free expression-
in the light of existing social attitudes and aims.
Perhaps it is time to shift our emphasis in obscenity regulation from
moral considerations to considerations of privacy and child-protection.
Perhaps not. In any event these questions have been raised, and the
courts have the opportunity to either further refine-or further confuse
-the traditional obscenity standards, or to develop an entirely new
basis for regulation. In short, the future should be as interesting as
the past.
There is a famous remark (frequently attributed to Bertrand Rus-
sell, but apparently made by Aldous Huxley) which should be repeated
at the close of any discussion of obscenity. As the story goes, a top-
level International Congress on the Suppression of Traffic in Obscene
Publications was once held in Geneva, where, according to Mr. Huxley:
[It] was unanimously decided that no definition of the word
'obscene' was possible. After which, having triumphantly assert-
ed that they did not know what they were talking about, the
-members of the congress settled down to their discussion.
97
interest-and to incite me to action. I am sure that the advertisers hope that
the action will be the purchase of their product, rather than some sex crime,
but they cannot be sure. In any event, here is a classic use of what I con-
sider to be obscenity, for it constitutes a kind of obtrusiveness that I, for
one, would like some protection against-an obtrusiveness described by Justice
Douglas as "[Advertisements] chock-full of thighs, ankles, calves, bosoms,
eyes and hair, to draw the potential buyer's attention to lotions, tires, food,
liquor, clothing, autos, and even insurance policies." Ginrburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463, 482 (1966) (dissenting opinion).97Huxley is quoted in K. KIUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES: PORNOGRAPHY IN AND OUT
OF COURT 249 (1967).
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